Army Chemical Review

SUMMER 2013

Army Chemical Review presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, smoke, flame, and civil support operations.

Issue link: http://chemical.epubxp.com/i/141522

Contents of this Issue

Navigation

Page 43 of 67

formations and the relocation of active USAR and ARNG personnel, Department of the Army (DA) civilians, and military technician billets. Most of the manning would be based on troop program unit and individual mobilization augmentation assignments. y Facilities. Two new headquarters facilities would be required—one for the new CBRN command and one for the new CBRN brigade. If existing facilities at installations such as Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, could be re-missioned, the cost impact could be minimized. In particular, refagging the existing 209th Regional Support Group as the foundation of the new USAR CBRN brigade would be benefcial with regard to available manning authorization and the use of the headquarters facilities at Fort Leonard Wood. If remissioning were not possible, temporary buildings would be used until new USAR facilities could be planned, budgeted, and built. Adequate facilities would represent the largest single cost of implementing this course of action. Future Direction/Long-Term Focus The proposed solution represents one possible course of action for improving the operational capability of the USAR CBRN force and, by extension, strengthening the Chemical Regiment as a whole. The Chemical Corps and USAR Command should work together to thoroughly develop this and other possible courses of action to address the problems and shortfalls described. Evaluative criteria must be established— particularly with regard to cost/beneft analyses and the identifcation of acceptable levels of strategic risk. Although a challenge, it would be possible to complete staffng by the end of the current fscal year. Results/Conclusion Like its Regular Army counterparts, the USAR has successfully restructured itself throughout the past 12 years to meet the challenges of transformation while at war. In becoming the operational reserve that was originally envisioned in the Abrams Doctrine5 of the 1970s, the USAR has used a framework of operational and functional commands to achieve the levels of readiness and fexibility necessary to meet the strategic needs of the Army. But to best meet the missions and demands identifed in the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,6 the time has come to align and integrate all USAR CBRN forces into a single, operational-level command. Such a USAR CBRN command would provide the training readiness oversight necessary to meet operational requirements, supply depth in operational reserve, and improve the quality and professionalism of the Chemical Corps. Units Criticized for Being Untrained, Unprepared," National Defense, June 2007, , accessed on 23 April 2013, (Numbers are based on CBRN forces currently assigned to FORSCOM: the 48th Chemical Brigade, with fve CBRN battalions [Regular Army]; the 415th Chemical Brigade and the 335th Signal Command, each with four CBRN battalions [USAR]; and the 31st Chemical Brigade, with two CBRN battalions [ARNG]). 3 "U.S. Army 20th Support Command: About Us," , accessed on 23 April 2013. 4 This statement is based on the author's experience in seeking to integrate training readiness oversight between Regular Army and RC formations. Common examples of this lack of cultural understanding include Regular Army misunderstandings about training resource limitations on RC units, ignorance concerning RC Army force generation planning timelines, and unawareness of RC demands for balancing concurrent military and civilian career expectations. In the fnal days of the Vietnam War, General Creighton Abrams (Chief of Staff of the Army, 1972–1974) initiated a strategy whereby the U.S. Army would never again go to war without a substantial mobilization of the Army RC. Although never formally articulated as a specifc doctrine, this strategy has become widely known and accepted as the Abrams Doctrine. 5 6 National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 13 February 2006, , accessed on 19 April 2013. At the time this article was written, Colonel Summers was the commander of the USAR Consequence Management Unit, Abington, Maryland. He is a graduate of the New Mexico Military Institute; and he holds master's degrees in international relations from Salve Regina University, Newport, Rhode Island, and in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Endnotes: 1 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, DOD, January 2012, , accessed on 9 May 2013. 2 Stew Magnuson, "National Guard, Army Chemical 42 Army Chemical Review

Articles in this issue

Links on this page

Archives of this issue

view archives of Army Chemical Review - SUMMER 2013