Army Chemical Review

SUMMER 2013

Army Chemical Review presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, smoke, flame, and civil support operations.

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By Major John Gervais Background I n 2010, President Barack Obama—like President George W. Bush before him—published an updated National Security Strategy. In that document, President Obama indicates that the United States will initiate programs that "deny terrorists weapons of mass destruction [WMD]."1 He further asserts that the United States will take action to prevent acts of terrorism and to "safeguard knowledge and capabilities in the life and chemical sciences that could be vulnerable to misuse."2 The Department of Defense (DOD) applied these directives to the strategy that was released to the force. In 2012, DOD published Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, which contains strategic planning guidance and policy covering the countering of WMD.3 The document states that U.S. forces conduct a range of activities aimed at preventing the proliferation and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical activity, to include "implementing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) Program and planning and operations to locate, monitor, track, interdict, and secure WMD and WMD-related components and the means and facilities to make them. [These activities] also include an active, whole-of-government effort to frustrate the ambitions of nations bent on developing WMD . . ."4 Unstable regimes around the world continue to develop and threaten to use WMD as a means of deterrence; and hostile, nonstate actors seek to acquire WMD. The United States and its global partners currently face several of these threats. Although published strategic guidance is broad and focuses on the immediate security of WMD stockpiles, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) Soldiers know that securing stockpiles is merely a stopgap measure. Only the 34 actual elimination of WMD will fulfll the President's strategic vision of denying the enemy the use of these weapons. While other branches of the U.S. armed forces are capable of securing WMD at the point of identifcation, the U.S. Army Chemical Corps serves as the primary organization for training partner forces in the doctrine and techniques necessary to eliminate residual stockpiles. Dictatorial regimes sometimes fail; and when those regimes are in possession of WMD, the ultimate fate of the WMD stockpiles must be determined. The world community must neutralize the threat, and the question of host nation invitation versus forceful occupation is irrelevant. The frst WMD elimination course of action to be considered generally involves civilian contracting. However, there are several faws associated with that approach, including the time, cost, and responsibilities involved under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (commonly known as the Chemical Weapons Convention).5 And due to the time involved and the site security implications, the concept of using U.S. Soldiers to eliminate WMD fails to meet the WMD elimination intent. The solution is to train host nation forces in WMD elimination operations and to place the responsibility for destruction on the Chemical Weapons Convention signatory authority. A successful model already exists. The Mission in Iraq From 2009 to 2010, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Chemical Corps—with the expertise of technical escort units; combat support companies; nuclear research and operations offcers; the U.S. Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear School (USACBRNS); and the U.S. Department Army Chemical Review

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