Army Chemical Review

SUMMER 2013

Army Chemical Review presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, smoke, flame, and civil support operations.

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By Dr. Boshra N. EL-Guindy W e live in an era of persistent confict. The complex challenges to U.S. security cannot be mastered solely by military means or through unilateral U.S. actions. Therefore, it is important that the U.S. Army continue multifaceted efforts that signifcantly contribute to the improvement of U.S. relations with allied and partnered nations and enhance the ability of the United States and its allied and partnered nations to meet those security challenges. As the Army continues its current security cooperation programs and activities (including collaborative efforts with selected international partner armies to build capacities in underdeveloped regions and countries) and continues to assess its effectiveness, it is looking for opportunities to build partnership capacities and relationships. For example, the Army has instituted a management information system that will signifcantly improve our Nation's ability to integrate Army and geographic combatant command security cooperation activities. The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction calls for a proactive counterproliferation strategy to defend against and defeat missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before they are unleashed.1 In fact, the entire philosophy of combating WMD is changing from one of passively reacting to a WMD attack to proactively and aggressively targeting and engaging WMD threat networks before the enemy can mount an attack. Under the battle command functional area, a commander could plan counterforce missions (active defense, WMD interdiction, WMD elimination, offensive operations) to engage enemy WMD threats, proactively deterring and preventing WMD attacks. Such a comprehensive, proactive approach addresses the importance of engaging actual or potential WMD actors as early as possible during the stages of WMD capability development. Earlier engagements result in improved security against the threat of WMD employment and in reduced costs for achieving that security. From an Army operational and tactical combating WMD operations perspective (and using the mission area strategy outlined in the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction), early engagement means frst investing in nonproliferation missions (threat reduction, security cooperation, partner activities) whenever possible. Summer 2013 If nonproliferation efforts fail and strategic interests dictate the removal of a WMD threat, the next engagement priority involves counterforce missions. Although the Army plays a role in each of these counterforce missions, it currently serves as the U.S. Joint Forces Command primary capability provider for WMD elimination operations—and it is likely to continue in that capacity. In the event that an adversary attempts or manages to use WMD, the missions of passive defense, active defense, and consequence management rise to the forefront. At this advanced stage of WMD capability development, early engagement involves working with partners and allies. Developing increased cooperation and an improved ability to conduct multinational combating WMD operations not only produces tangible benefts with regard to mission execution, but also strengthens our message to potential adversaries that their development or use of WMD will not achieve the desired effects. At the operational and tactical levels, aspects of early engagements with partners and allies include actions to plan and conduct multinational training exercises, share responsibilities and equipment, and provide technical assistance. Achieving increased levels of interoperability within multinational battle command systems and specialized combating WMD sensors and equipment assists in early engagement. In this partnership environment, it is likely that all echelons will incorporate multinational force elements in major combat and irregular warfare campaigns—and that they will encounter cultural differences among friends, combatants, and noncombatants. And the more signifcant the differences between Army capabilities and those of our potential partners, the more diffcult it may be to effectively harmonize multicultural operations. An understanding of the cultural differences that exist is essential. While integration efforts are especially benefcial in the area of information sharing, requirements for collaborative planning, common data standards, and multilevel security must be resolved. These requirements will form the basis for any capability statements. Role of Culture in Effective Security Partnerships Just as culture affects how a military organization conducts its internal affairs, it also infuences the organization's relations with allies. Cultural variations among militaries can inhibit the 43

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