Army Chemical Review presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, smoke, flame, and civil support operations.
Issue link: https://chemical.epubxp.com/i/759309
25 Winter 2016 T he Syrian civil war, in its 6th year, has shown the darker side of modern warfare with shifting alliances and ethos and outside players. The world watches mass death and destruction in a period of history when sta- bility and peaceful resolution are expected to be the norm. The ancient and destructive method of waging total war has only been augmented by modernity and all of its devastating efficiency, including the use of chemical weap- ons. These devastating attacks have provided the interna- tional chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) and counter weapons of mass destruction communities with real-world chemical case studies of a scope not seen since World War I. These incidents represent an unprecedented opportunity. This article provides a brief review of the 2013 report of the United Nations (UN) mission to investigate allegations of chemical weapons being used in the Syrian Arab Republic and the independent report of the August Ghouta attacks. 1, 2 The intent is to highlight potential dis- cussion points on the developments of CBRN defense made in the 100 years between the trenches of the western front and the Arab Spring. 3 Such discussions include Soldier rec- ognition of a CBRN release, the rise of urban targeting and the 360-degree threat, civilian first responder training, and effective forensic techniques. Following an international outcry, beginning in early 2013, the Secretary General of the UN established a UN mission to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The mission mem- bers were tasked "to ascertain the facts related to the al- legations of the use of chemical weapons and to gather rel- evant data and to undertake the necessary analyses for this purpose . . .." 4 The head of the mission was Professor Ake Sellstrom from Sweden. Sellstrom was augmented with members of the World Health Organization and the Orga- nization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Ground investigations began on 19 August 2013. The Syrian Arab Republic government initially authorized 14 days for the team to conduct site assessments, casualty interviews, and sampling. The initial investigation focused on the credible allega- tions of attacks in Khan Al Asal, Saraqueb, and Sheik Maq- sood. The team was authorized to visit other suspected sites if time allowed. This changed in the wake of the Ghouta at- tacks on 21 August 2013. According to cease-fire terms, the UN mission was redirected into the Ghouta sites and access was granted for 5 hours a day from 26 to 29 August. The team left Syria on 31 August 2013 and returned in September for five additional days. Team members expanded their site list to include the Martyr Yusuf Al Azmah Military Hospital, Jobar, Bahhariyeh, and Ashrafiah Sahnya. 5 The findings were based almost exclusively on the evidence directly col- lected by the mission and were published in December 2013. No outside forensic samples were accepted, and all witness- es were independently corroborated by investigating person- nel. The report does cite the final reports of other entities, including the Syrian government, but only where they cor- roborate UN findings. A more in-depth report of the Ghouta attacks was submitted on 13 September 2013. Both reports provided narratives of the incidents and the forensic results. It is important to point out that the task was to identify the use of chemical warfare agents (CWAs); therefore, there is no conjecture about the responsible parties. The investigat- ed attacks were in government-held or contested areas, and all sampling and interviews were done in the presence of Syrian government officials. In view of these investigative constraints, this article adheres to issues involving conven- tional military and civilian populations. The following text discusses the emerging themes of the investigation. The narratives of the events do not mention the CBRN detection equipment used by military or civilian forces. Whether this is due to a lack of equipment or training by the Syrian regime is beyond the intent of this article. Our own troops need to understand the importance of effective, up- wind, on-site detection and nontechnological solutions. Con- sistent reports of foul-smelling odors and audible releases indicate that the victims were aware of a change in their immediate operational environment. The delays in response indicate that the average Soldier was unaware of the proper response or even that there was a risk of contamination until after a significant exposure occurred. The incident report for Ashrafiah Sahnaya indicates that there was a 45-minute de- lay in evacuating casualties. 6 At Bahhariyeh, personal pro- tective equipment was issued 20 minutes after severe symp- toms occured. 7 The lack of intensive CBRN defense training and education is rather surprising given the appearance of CWAs on the battlefield before both incidents. Part of the apparent lack of preparedness by the Syrian troops could be due to a belief that they were not operating in an area vulnerable to CWA attacks based on outdated doctrine and training materials. Surveying the sketches contained in modern doctrinal publications indicates that there are few depictions of troops working on a contaminated military operations in urban ter- rain (MOUT) site despite increased awareness of the vulner- ability of dense populations and urban centers. The gas at- tacks of World War I, like most of the conventional fighting, were largely away from major urban centers. CBRN Soldiers of today are still taught about large gas clouds moving over fields and forests and how to set up decontamination lines in the forest. We are not unaware of the risk, but CBRN training remains technically focused in its own environment without integration into modern warfare. Without correlating the Syrian and U.S. training doc- trines, we can still see where gaps arise. MOUT is inherently