Army Chemical Review

WINTER 2016

Army Chemical Review presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, smoke, flame, and civil support operations.

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Army Chemical Review 34 stated that local and government officials and incident re- sponders did not know much about hazards or mitigation ca- pabilities of biological terrorism and that lack of knowledge led to a diminished ability to make appropriate choices in a biological terrorism attack situation. 10 The results of this study can be seen throughout the world. A great deal of money is spent on nuclear weapons and defense; and chemical defense receives a great deal of atten- tion, given the widespread use of chemical weapons during World War II, events such as the sarin attacks on the Tokyo subway, and industrial accidents that occur more frequently than anyone would like. However, according to a paper pub- lished by the Military Institute of Preventive Medicine in Belgrade, Serbia, "Biological weapons are nearly as easy to develop, far more lethal, and easier to deliver than chemi- cal weapons; and unlike nuclear weapons, they are inexpen- sive to produce and the risk of detection is low. Progress in molecular biology has made fast and easy biotoxin produc- tion possible." 11 Unfortunately, the information is too easily available through the Internet; all that is needed is a little source material cultivation. Many developed nations initi- ated biological weapons programs in the late 1920s and con- tinued until the creation of the Biological and Toxin Weap- ons Convention in 1972. Some even continued beyond that. 12 This means that many developed nations had the source material needed to create biological weapons. Although those programs should have been dismantled and the source material safety destroyed or transferred to less nefarious programs, they may not have. With the know-how and the availability of the material, it is only a matter of time before another biological terrorism event occurs. When another biological terrorism event occurs, micro- bial forensics will play a much more important role than it has in the past. With the lessons from the Amerithrax in- vestigation, we now know how important microbial forensics will be in identifying the source of material and a suspect. Simply identifying the type of biological material will do lit- tle to narrow the suspected source of the material. The iden- tification of a particular strain or substrain will be vital in discovering the origins of the biological material. The goal of the investigation will be to identify the biological material at a level of scrutiny that will allow for this type of character- ization. Earlier identification of the source material narrows the scope of the investigation sooner, which will hopefully result in the earlier identification of a perpetrator or perpe- trators. This chain of events can counter the proliferation of the know-how and material required to carry out a success- ful biological terrorism attack. Conclusion This article discusses microbial forensics as a tool for use in the investigation of biological terrorism. There may be a plethora of uses for microbial forensics in the future; but for now, it fills a niche in biological attack incidents that no other technique is capable of filling. Endnotes: 1 Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation," , accessed on 13 September 2016. 2 Gregory D. Koblentz and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Tracing an Attack: The Promise and Pitfalls of Microbial Forensics," Sur- vival, Vol. 52, Issue No. 1, February 2010, pp. 159–186. 3 Sarah E. Schmedes et al., "Expansion of Microbial Foren- sics," Journal of Clinical Microbiology, February 2016. 4 Edwin Eugene Steussy et al., "Microbial Forensics: The Biggest Thing Since DNA?" University of California Da- vis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 416, School of Law, University of California, Davis, February 2015, p. 14, , accessed on 12 September 2016. 5 Stacey M. Broomall et al., "Whole-Genome Sequencing in Microbial Forensic Analysis of Gamma-Irradiated Microbial Materials," Applied and Microbiology, Vol. 82, 2016, pp. 596–607. 6 Ronald M. Atlas, "Microbial Forensics—Taking Diagnostic Microbiology to the Next Level," Clinical Microbiology Newslet- ter, Issue 13, July 2004, pp. 100–103. 7 Koblentz and Tucker. 8 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Emer- gency Preparedness and Response: Bioterrorism Overview," , accessed on 20 September 2016. 9 Vincent Barras and Gilbert Greub, "History of Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism," Clinical Microbiology and Infection, Vol. 20, No. 6, 2014, pp. 497–502. 10 Mark Korbitz and David Malet, "Bioterrorism and Local Agency Preparedness: Results From an Experimental Study in Risk Communication," , 2014, pp. 861–873. 11 B. Jakovljevic and V. Radosavljevic, "Bioterrorism—Types of Epidemics, New Epidemiological Paradigm and Levels of Pre- vention," Journal of the Royal Institute of Public Health, Mili- tary Institute of Preventive Medicine, Belgrade, Serbia, 2005, pp. 549–557. 12 H. J. Jansen et al., "Biological Warfare, Bioterrorism, and Biocrime," Clinical Microbiology and Infection, 6 June 2014, p. 489. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro- duction and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (also known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention), 10 April 1972, , accessed on 13 September 2016. Staff Sergeant Benecke is the officer in charge of the CBRN Preparedness Support Europe, Defense Threat Re- duction Agency. He is currently working in Europe to build part- ner nation capacity in preparedness and response to CBRN and

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