Army Chemical Review


Army Chemical Review presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, smoke, flame, and civil support operations.

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Page 30 of 67

New CWC Requirements By 2009, coalition forces had discovered and destroyed thousands of Iraqi chemical weapons; consequently, U.S. destruction records needed to be turned over to the GoI for its declaration to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.6 Iraq's new membership in the CWC required that the GoI be responsible for the destruction of all Iraqi chemical weapons, including chemical weapons entombed in Gulf War bunkers. In addition, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons required that Iraq disclose the history of its WMD program and submit its chemical weapons destruction plans. Regardless of whether munitions were empty or not, those designed for chemical fll were required to be reported to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.7 To comply with CWC membership requirements, Iraq needed the capacity to detect and eliminate chemical weapon materials and accept a commitment to nonproliferation. The development of a CWC compliance capacity also resulted in improvements to Iraqi WMD detection, nonproliferation, and counterproliferation capabilities. Thus, building partner capacity for the CWC program supported an overarching combating WMD strategy that required U.S.-Iraqi interagency cooperation in order to satisfy the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons requirements.8 Fusion Cell In early 2008, after several major WMD-related missions and planning endeavors in Iraq, General David Petraeus, the commander of the Multinational Force–Iraq, took the advice of then Brigadier General Kevin Wendel, commander of the 20th Support Command (CBRNE), to stand up a fusion cell of WMD subject matter experts. The cell was designed to augment the Multinational Force–Iraq staff for CBRNE planning and to synchronize combating WMD efforts. From 2008 to 2010, the fusion cell was manned with CBRNE subject matter experts from the 20th Support Command and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The three combating WMD pillars—nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management—in turn, give rise to eight military mission areas. Successful CWC compliance requires competence in chemical weapons elimination, which comprises an aspect of one of the military mission areas. Conducting combating WMD support tasks can be diffcult to coordinate across the U.S. government interagency process, and the addition of a language barrier and coordination with foreign government ministries required considerable personal diplomacy and creativity from fusion cell members. One of the biggest challenges was understanding the roles, responsibilities, and missions at the policy, combatant command, and operational levels in a complex interagency, partnered, and international environment. Fusion cell tasks included facilitating the release of U.S. chemical weapons destruction records to the GoI and developing and coordinating the frst-ever GoI CBRNE consequence management tabletop exercise. The small, multidisciplinary team of CBRNE subject matter experts simultaneously conducted strategic planning, fostered partner engagements, and coordinated operational Summer 2013 CBRNE support to fulfll capacity-building requirements, which evolved over time. For Iraq to combat the most basic WMD threats and eliminate recovered chemical warfare material, partnering was required at many levels; therefore, information sharing and the integration of the right people were extremely important. Building partner capacity goals and objectives are set at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Some of the building partner capacity goals and objectives are listed in Figure 1, page 30. After analyzing the building partner capacity goals, objectives, and tasks for CWC compliance, it was apparent that the most signifcant combating WMD support objectives could be simultaneously addressed across several lines of effort (political, economic, security, diplomatic, rule of law). Due to the drawdown of combat troops, the United States needed to quickly boost the quantity of trainers and equipment available to assist the Iraqis in CBRNE identifcation and destruction and to develop a consequence management response capacity for postwar Iraq. The development of Iraqi civil capacities— not just military security forces—needed to be incorporated into the end state. One of the primary building partner capacity objectives for CWC compliance in Iraq was the development of a CBRNE response, identifcation, and elimination capability for recovered chemical warfare (including WMD) material. It was also strategically important that the GoI pass the nonproliferation legislation in order to demonstrate Iraq's political will and commitment. Iraq's progress toward satisfying United Nations Security Council requirements represented another supporting effort involving ministries relevant to CWC and combating WMD capacity building. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 requires that states "adopt and enforce appropriate, effective laws which [do not allow] any nonstate actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons" that could be used for harmful purposes.9 The development of nonproliferation capacities supported U.S. lines of effort to improve Iraqi security, governance, and the rule of law. Iraq's commitment to nonproliferation is important for U.S. interests in regional stability, legitimate governance, and the free fow of commerce.10 Executing CWC and combating WMD capacity-building efforts with the GoI required determining the U.S. departments and agencies and corresponding coalition resources needed for partnering with Iraqi ministries or offces of primary responsibility (see Figure 2, page 31). The Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate—an independent, semiautonomous ministry that is subordinate to the Ministry of Science and Technology—was appointed as the GoI lead for reporting to the international community. At the strategic level, the Multinational Force–Iraq fusion cell partnered with the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate and relevant Iraqi ministries through the embassy. Additionally, the fusion cell (through the embassy) coordinated with the Ministry of Science and Technology and other signifcant Iraqi ministries such as the 29

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