Army Chemical Review

SUMMER 2013

Army Chemical Review presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, smoke, flame, and civil support operations.

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Figure 3. Building partner capacity activities for Iraqi CWC compliance review the challenges and evaluate the gaps in combating WMD planning and CBRNE elimination that existed in Iraq. Missions such as the destruction of large caches of recovered chemical warfare munitions and the extraction of yellowcake required very specialized planning and resources and the deployment of CBRNE capabilities from the United States. This building partner capacity effort revealed the criticality of defned end states and the interagency and intergovernmental coordination, integration, and synchronization needed to conduct partnering at appropriate strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The Prime Minister's National Operations Centre served as an appropriate venue for the coordination of high-level meetings, conferences, and exercises among GoI ministries. The sharing of information and the inclusion of the Agency for International Development and the U.S. Army Public Affairs whenever possible facilitated strategic communication and supported end state goals for the eventual transition of authority to the GoI. Challenges regarding the releasability of U.S. doctrine and the development of Iraqi Chemical Defense Company lesson plans were resolved when the USACBRNS deployed an element to assist U.S. CBRN trainers in-country. It was also learned that CBRNE detection and confrmatory capabilities were needed among relevant GoI ministries. In addition, Iraq required appropriate CBRNE and all-hazards response capabilities in the military and civilian sectors. Much of the CWC building partner capacity effort was enabled by the Multinational Force–Iraq fusion cell, which allowed the U.S. government to synchronize CBRNE efforts with the U.S Embassy, the Central Command, the Training and Doctrine Command, interagency partners, and operational entities. Personnel who had experience with cooperative threat reduction, elimination, and consequence management were assets to the Multinational Force–Iraq staff. The fusion cell developed strategic plans and provided specialized 32 augmentation to engagements led by the Multinational Force– Iraq (and later U.S. Forces–Iraq) in a complex and dynamic environment. The fusion cell concept demonstrated the need for a team, cell, or joint interagency task force to be focused on the entire spectrum of combating WMD mission areas, rather than on just one of the mission areas. Combating WMD efforts cannot be carried out by staff offcers on a parttime basis, and they should not be tasked to a single agency such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The fusion cell consolidated and expanded operation orders to ensure a unity of effort for nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management and to increase detail and command emphasis in the Joint Campaign Plan to support combating WMD goals and CWC efforts. The use of an expeditionary CBRNE planning element should be evaluated as a means to enhance niche planning efforts and to build specialized partner capacity. The CWC building partner capacity efforts were a success, as the Iraqi Chemical Defense Company was fully manned, trained, and equipped in 2010—providing the GoI with a CBRNE response and elimination capability.11 Thus, the United States helped successfully build a CWC capability in Iraq, while establishing a basic elimination and combating WMD capability. This capability serves as a shining example of enabling greater strategic objectives for nonproliferation and containment in the region. The improved capacity for CWC compliance supported the combating WMD effort and many other lines of effort and also enabled a responsible U.S drawdown. This was especially important considering the potential for future regional threats, including WMD and other transnational threats from neighboring countries such as Iran, Syria, and other Arab states in the Persian Gulf. To be successful, building partner capacity efforts must include relevant government entities and must be synchronized across strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Army Chemical Review

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