Army Chemical Review

SUMMER 2013

Army Chemical Review presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, smoke, flame, and civil support operations.

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former weapons scientists now conduct peaceful work for the International Science and Technology Center.47 The DOD supported numerous activities within the framework of the threat reduction program, primarily reducing threats in the former Soviet Union. Activities that signifcantly contributed to the reduction of biological threats include the elimination of infrastructure, the completion of biosafety and biosecurity upgrades and related training, and the performance of cooperative research. The DOD initially referred to these inclusive activities (and associated program administration requirements) as the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP); the activities are now collectively referred to as the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP).48 In 2007, Congress called upon the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study of BTRP activities and to recommend additional activities to be carried out in the future. It became clear that, based on the resulting discussions and six major National Academy of Science recommendations, the BTRP was considered a program that had merit and was worthy of support for its continuation and expansion.49 In the fscal year 2011 budget estimate submission for the CTRP, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) requested the expansion of efforts to build more biosafety, biosecurity, and biosurveillance capacity in Africa. In the past few years, by reaching out to Pakistan and selected areas of Asia and Africa, CTRP initiatives have shifted toward biological threat reduction.50 The CBEP (formerly the BTRP) has strived to— ● Consolidate and secure dangerous pathogen collections in central reference laboratories or repositories. ● Improve the safety and security of biological facilities. ● Enhance the capability of partner states to detect, diagnose, and report bioterror attacks and potential pandemics. ● Engage scientists with biological weapons expertise in research that supports force protection, medical countermeasures, diagnostics, and modeling. In addition, ongoing work emphasizes cooperation and collaborative research among institutes and scientists to improve the ability to detect and diagnose highly infectious disease outbreaks and related biothreats.51 An expansion beyond former Soviet Union countries— sought largely to support the President's National Strategy to Counter Biological Threats52 —is accomplished by supporting the "seven objectives to PROTECT53 against misuse of the life sciences to support biological weapons proliferation and terrorism."54 In 2010, the BTRP/CBEP received authorization to expand its efforts to Africa—frst setting its sights on Kenya and Uganda. As they seek to continue cooperative biological engagements on the continent in the next few years, DOD offcials are pursuing three courses of action: ● Conduct a regional effort. The regional effort would be conducted in cooperation with the East Africa Community—the regional, intergovernmental organization 54 of Kenya, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republics of Rwanda and Burundi. The program would improve disease detection, diagnostics, and reporting among the fve countries—where previous endemic disease outbreaks have challenged prompt medical responses. An added beneft of improving disease detection, diagnostics, and reporting within the East Africa Community would be the establishment of close working relationships among the health ministries of the various countries. Should a bioterror-related incident (such as the theft of a disease sample) occur, the health ministers would know one another and would, therefore, be better prepared to effectively work through an incident. ● Establish a center of excellence. A center of excellence would be established in South Africa, where an initial, low-level capability within the construct of CBEP would be developed for the purpose of taking advantage of the country's role in nonproliferation measures to infuence other countries. South Africa was once involved in an offensive weapons of mass destruction program, which has since been dropped. Some offcials believe that this could serve as a positive example for others in the region, dissuading them from pursuing such capabilities. ● Persuade Djibouti to build a biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) laboratory. If Djiboutians could be persuaded to build a lower-level BSL-2 laboratory in lieu of the BSL-3 laboratory that they desire, the U.S. government would be able to help them with the research and storage capability necessary to reduce the occurrence of dangerous diseases.55 Conclusion According to DOD offcials associated with these efforts, engaging leaders from various African countries serves to support U.S. national interests by pursuing the curtailment of biological threats that might fnd their way to America and also fosters long-term relationships with African countries.56 Those relationships may open further avenues for reducing the potential threat of bioterrorism on the continent and create other opportunities for cooperative protection measures. Not only are these the message and position of the DOD, but they also appear to be part of a serious whole-of-government approach. In his July 2011 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, Mr. Donald Yamamoto—acting assistant secretary of the U.S. Department of State—mentioned DOD cooperative threat reduction efforts in East Africa. Mr. Yamamoto emphasized that "without effective cooperation within the U.S. government, we will not be able to address the issues of terrorism, piracy, and confict in places like Sudan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo."57 This theme, the concern of bioterrorism emanating from Africa, and the need to expand cooperative engagement may have best been described by Senator Lugar just before his November 2010 trip, when he stated, "Building capacity for biosurveillance in Africa is essential. However, it will be a complex undertaking. This arena is flled with international public health programs, indigenous efforts, and multiple [nongovernmental organizations]. As the [CBEP] moves forward, Army Chemical Review

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