Army Chemical Review presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, smoke, flame, and civil support operations.
Issue link: https://chemical.epubxp.com/i/533676
Summer 2015 29 and U.S. Air Force liaisons must understand why—and when—it is important to target and eliminate enemy CBRN decontamination assets. And the staff weather offcer must understand the effects of wind speed, wind direction, tem- perature, and weather conditions on chemical munitions. Missing Element An area that remains inadequately addressed is that of battlefeld obscuration. With only two smoke generator com- panies remaining in the total Army force (both within the Army National Guard), the Army lacks the ability to ade- quately plan and execute lengthy smoke missions in support of gap crossings or breaching operations. The Field Artillery and Engineer Branches are currently attempting to elimi- nate the obscuration capability shortfall. However, in the meantime, maneuver commanders continue to expect a reli- able, persistent, and survivable asset that can support gap- crossing operations. Although Mission Command Training Program scenarios allow for the allocation of smoke units to maneuver formations, commanders and staffs have not received current practical training in smoke employment. Moreover, the fact that CBRN staffs lack suffcient train- ing and experience to plan obscuration for commanders is of even greater concern. The lack of capability within the force has resulted in a generation of leaders who have little practical experience in the employment of long-duration ob- scuration. Consequently, the commander of III Corps has joined a growing list of commanders who are asking the Army to close the capability and simulation gaps. The U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center must propose and support the return of obscuration assets to help fll this ca- pability gap and to make rapid and tangible progress toward closing it. Current doctrine and structure address only two- command post confgurations. However, as training pro- gressed for the III Corps staff and subordinate units, the corps commander quickly determined that a third element was necessary in order to provide adequate command over- sight of corps security area activities that directly impact the ability of the corps to maintain momentum and preserve combat power. Therefore, the commander implemented a mission command concept that employs three command posts—a main command post, a tactical command post, and a corps support command post. Each command post is capa- ble of executing all III Corps warfghting functions, allowing the commander the to move around the battlefeld. The III Corps CBRN staff ensures robust and continuous support across the security, close, and deep fghts through An armored vehicle-launched bridge is moved into position during a gap-crossing operation. (Photo by Ms. Dawn Arden, Fort Leonard Wood Guidon.)