Army Chemical Review presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, smoke, flame, and civil support operations.
Issue link: https://chemical.epubxp.com/i/759309
Army Chemical Review 16 catalysts for innovation, but the effectiveness of reactive in- novation is often limited. Bold leaders implement innova- tion before a crisis occurs when planning factors are still unknown-unknowns and when outside-the-box thinking is still outside the box. In this way, leaders instill a culture of trying new ideas from all corners of an organization and ac- cepting failure as an essential aspect of learning. The average Army leader operates primarily in a non- crisis or normative environment, constrained by various annual, biannual, quarterly, and monthly training, certifi- cation, maintenance, and medical readiness requirements. Additionally, Army regulations, doctrine, quantitative as- sessments, fiscal limitations, and force reductions contrib- ute to a culture of reductive and renovative thinking. The sheer volume of requirements placed on leaders and their units has arguably created a culture where simply achieving the standards represents a huge success. In Smith's model, the first five levels of change—effectiveness, efficiency, continuous improvement, elimination, and benchmarking—are described as doing the right things, doing things right, doing things better, doing away with things, and doing things others are doing, re- spectively. 7 The similarities between Smith's model and the structured pathway to success for Army leaders is undeni- able. But the Army does not achieve this mindset simply through casual inculcation. Smith's levels closely mirror the criteria by which Army leaders and units are evaluated. In fact, in my experience, Smith's benchmarking level of doing things others are doing is the standard with which too many Army leaders measure success. A study on Army mandatory training, published by the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, sheds some light on the severity of the Army challenge. 8 The study found that company commanders were required to perform 297 days of mandatory training per year, despite the avail- ability of only 256 training days. Given this reality and the fact that mandatory training requirements are closely tracked, too many Army leaders are simply incapable of moving beyond Smith's first levels of effectiveness with- out assuming some degree of risk. Ironically, responsible Army leaders faced with limited time and resources often assume risk by deliberately failing to meet Army stan- dards to achieve more immediate mission readiness objec- tives. Conversely, leaders who choose to adhere strictly to Army requirements may arguably do so at the expense of mission readiness. Deliberate nonadherence to administra- tive requirements has become the Army standard and an example of Zeisler's inside-the-system thinking. An outside- the-system approach would consider significantly reducing the number of requirements on unit commanders. Ground- breaking! Risk-taking in the Army is commonly viewed as unnec- essary, a sign of poor judgment, or a poor use of resources, which explains why it's so often discouraged and so rarely employed. Neither competition among leaders nor a desire to have a lasting impact have waned over the years, but improving upon existing capabilities is far more common than the implementation of real innovation. Junior leaders who grow up in a culture that focuses only on developing improvements to existing systems are less likely to be able to think innovatively as senior leaders. Thus, inside-the- system thinkers beget inside-the-system thinkers. This is important to realize when assessing the future of the Army. Bill Zipp describes inside-the-system leaders as stabiliz- ers and outside-the-system leaders as innovators. 9 Stabiliz- ers are those who focus on maintaining the status quo—not disrupting current systems or creating unnecessary crises. Stabilizers have a tendency to be system and procedural ex- perts and rarely deviate from those known points of refer- ence. Innovators are often no less knowledgeable about sys- tems and processes, but view them as a point of departure rather than as a destination or objective unto themselves. Innovators are always looking for ways to break new ground; they are not necessarily concerned with personal ridicule, and they don't really care if they tip the boat over as long as everyone knows how to swim. Zipp implies that innovators are often not concerned with maintaining a particular orga- nizational structure, whereas stabilizers serve an important role as the guardians of organizational standards, proce- dures, processes, and systems. These organizational aspects are designed to manage information reinforce hierar- chy, improve efficiency, and enforce traditions, which is why stabilizers are often highly valued in military organizations and innovators are often seen as disruptive outsiders. Army leaders who act as stabilizers are only one impedi- ment to innovation. Far more impactful are the tools by which readiness is measured and leaders are evaluated. In short, innovation is often not immediately identified, mea- sured, or valued because it does not fall in line with known standards. Furthermore, if innovation fails to quickly cre- ate a new normal and gain the support of its own stabilizer leaders, it often does not endure beyond the implementation phase. The professional risks associated with failed innova- tion are very high for an Army professional, which is why in- novation is so uncommon in a noncrisis environment. On the other hand, a crisis scenario can change many known factors in a way that requires innovation for survival. A crisis or other situation that radically changes plan- ning assumptions, normative factors, or paradigms can be a powerful catalyst for innovation and can encourage outside-the-system risk taking, but there's no guarantee of support or success. Innovative leaders often do not limit their search for innovation to their inner circle or the senior leaders of an organization. Zeisler suggests that innovators solicit and encourage innovative ideas from everyone. In do- ing so, they challenge the norm, teach a new way of thinking from the four corners of their organizations, and empower exponentially more thought on any given topic. This is often essential in a crisis, where unanticipated factors are com- mon and previous assumptions or ways of thinking are not the path to a solution. Zeisler suggests that, after a crisis has passed, there's often a race back to previous norms. He also claims that this will absolutely lead to stagnation, as suggested in Smith's model. 10 The Army faces a challenge in