Army Chemical Review presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, smoke, flame, and civil support operations.
Issue link: https://chemical.epubxp.com/i/759309
23 Winter 2016 By Captain Michael T. Lindsay O perational decontamination is a brigade combat team organic capability. When executed, it can re- duce the effects and spread of contamination across the battlefield and provide temporary relief from an elevat- ed chemical mission-oriented protective posture. It serves as an option for ground commanders to continue the fight while surviving in a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environment. However, decontamination systems are often underutilized and poorly maintained and units often fail to train and certify internal decontamination teams. These become significant problems when units de- ploy to combat training centers, where they will be expected to operate under CBRN conditions. "Decontamination is a key component of the over- arching concept of contamination control and supports the postattack restoration of forces and operations to a near-normal capability." –Field Manual 3-11, Multi-Service Doctrine - cal, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations 1 Soldiers of the 2d Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2d Brigade Support Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington, learned how important equipment readiness and CBRN training are following an early-morning simulated chemical strike during the force- on-force period of Rotation 16-03 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. As 2-chlorobenzalmalononil- rile (CS) gas and yellow smoke (used to simulate a chemical strike) filled the bridge support area, Soldiers donned pro- tective masks and items of chemical gear that were within reach. Medics within the support area began treating con- taminated casualties. As the initial chaos of the event seemed to settle, lead- ers in the company and battalion command posts populated their CBRN 1 reports using the 2-2 SBCT tactical standard operating procedure. Once relayed to the brigade CBRN cell, further analysis, along with hazard plots constructed on mission command systems for dissemination through the CBRN Warning and Reporting System, were prepared for the commander. What seemed to be a moderately well- executed response to a chemical attack in the bridge sup- port area, unfortunately came to a halt when the unit could not locate immediate decontamination supplies or operable M17 or M26 decontamination systems. This complicated op- erations on the ground and at higher echelons. What should have been an internal unit capability immediately became a problem set for commanders. After an observer controller/ trainer-led hot wash, Soldiers and vehicles from the contam- inated unit were sent for a decontamination linkup with the 63d Hazard Response Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, which was pre-positioned a few kilometers away for decon- tamination support to the SBCT. When ground units are capable of timely self-decontamination (immediate and operational), they can rapidly return to the fight without the elongated and deg- radational effects of elevated protective posture. However, when this capability is neglected, either by a lack of training Soldiers set up a decontamination area after a simulated chemical strike on 2-2 SBCT.