Army Chemical Review presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, smoke, flame, and civil support operations.
Issue link: https://chemical.epubxp.com/i/759309
19 Winter 2016 T he U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excel- lence (MSCoE) recently took a novel approach to requirements development that integrated U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM) Forward Area Science and Technology (FAST) personnel; joint Service laboratory scientists and engineers; program management office personnel; rapid prototyping personnel; experimentation personnel; requirements writ- ers; training developers; and concept personnel to analyze an emerging operational need and craft a requirements document. What made this effort novel was that all parties were involved in the planning, execution, and analysis of activities that are typically not integrated through inter- agency involvement. The problem that was addressed by these interagency personnel was the issue of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This threat has become a significant problem during current contingency operations. Insurgents have been par- ticularly adept at leveraging readily available commercial products for use as components of fabricated explosive de- vices. The insurgents take advantage of a long regional his- tory of tribal trade alliances and commercial networks that complicate the intelligence collection process by making it difficult to obtain human intelligence. In the contingency area of operations, the homemade explosive-based IED fab- rication process often relies on those closed tribal networks. While the nuances of a closed, tribal-based insurgent pro- cess may make it very difficult to collect human intelligence for a specific network, a wider process view can be useful in identifying the activities that are required when fabricating IEDs. Understanding the elements of that process can be useful in addressing current and future threats. IED use has become prolific, largely because, in effect, it provides the insurgent force with a capability similar to that of precision-guided munitions without a significant invest- ment in force structure. While historically an economy-of- force issue, IEDs have become an enduring challenge with ever increasing levels of technical and operational sophisti- cation. Indeed, the threat has implications that extend far- ther than the current area of operations. The IED threat varies from devices designed using a kit to purely homemade devices. In the current theater, IEDs have generated a business; some players even offer a pack- age deal that can include videotaping an IED event to en- sure that the event receives maximum media exposure. A fabricated explosive device is composed of a main charge, an initiating or booster charge, a container (which can also produce fragmentation effects), and an actuating mechanism. There is a process and timeline associated with the collection of the components and assembly of the de- vice. An element of the insurgency typically provides guid- ance and financial resources. In a traditional insurgency, this element is termed the underground. An auxiliary is formed and assigned the responsibility of collecting compo- nent parts and intelligence. Finally, indigenous or itinerant specialty personnel assemble the device from the collected components in several discrete steps. This entire process ex- ists within a network, and attacking that network is key to addressing the IED threat. The scope of these threats is so widespread that interdiction cannot be focused purely upon the fabricated device. As this problem began to manifest, it became clear that there was a need to study explosive signatures in general— and specifically, homemade explosives. Starting in 2009, the U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC), Maryland, led an Army technology objective (Detection of Unknown Bulk Explosives) designed to identify signatures of unknown bulk explosives and determine core detection technologies suitable for the screening, presumptive detec- tion, and identification of explosives and explosive precur- sors. This was a collaborative effort among several Service laboratories and academic communities, and it addressed many topics, including specific identification technologies, the environmental fate of homemade explosive materials, typical presentations in the field, and test methods for the preparation and presentation of challenges ranging from bulk materials to trace residue on various surfaces. Massive quantities of ammonia nitrate were being trans- ported on road networks, and it became clear that there was a need to interdict the network as early as possible within