Army Chemical Review presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, smoke, flame, and civil support operations.
Issue link: https://chemical.epubxp.com/i/759309
Army Chemical Review
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emphasis or the failure to perform disciplined maintenance,
it becomes a problem for CBRN staff to resolve for their
commander at the time of the incident. As was true for
2-2 SBCT, this can force the early commitment of available
decontamination support assets during an operation. Divi-
sion level assets, such as hazard response companies, may
not be available for each brigade combat team commander.
If unavailable, contaminated units that are incapable of self-
decontamination may need to remain in extended Mission-
Oriented Protective Posture Level 4 until CBRN agents dis-
sipate or additional resources arrive.
Future will likely put ground commanders face
to face with an enemy that can and may employ CBRN
weapons or use toxic industrial materials to disrupt, de-
grade, and shape the battlefield. Commanders are presented
with these operational scenarios at the National Training
Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk,
Louisiana. Operators who are trained and licensed on fully
mission-capable decontamination systems will mitigate the
effects that CBRN weapons can have across our Army.
Endnote:
1
Field Manual 3-11, Multi-Service Doctrine
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations, 1 July 2011.
Captain Lindsay is the brigade CBRN officer for 2-2 SBCT
at Joint Base Lewis–McChord. He is a graduate of the CBRN
Captain's Career Course and Technical Escort (L3) Course. He
holds a bachelor's degree
University,
Soldiers decontaminate other Soldiers after a chemical
strike on 2-2 SBCT.
subject matter experts in their respective fields, it is the re-
sponsibility of staff members to bring expertise to the table
that would enable the battalion to complete its assigned
mission. This leads to my next point: CBRN officers must
constantly seek out methods to make themselves disposable
as leaders. I suggest this not to make the Branch irrelevant,
but to make the Branch so relevant in the formation that
CBRN officers become disposable. CBRN officers should im-
part as much knowledge to the formation as possible to en-
sure that the unit is never set up for failure.
Bullets aren't associated with a particular duty position;
anyone, from the commander to the CBRN officer, can go
down. I propose a question: If you were killed in action today
and a CBRN strike occurred, would the unit be able to carry
on without you or would it be lost?
Conclusion
Disciplined initiative is essential to our success as a
Corps. Every action is deliberate, with a clear and concise
end state to maximize our ability to enable the protection
warfighting function. Condition setting is critical to the suc-
cess of every unit in the Army. We utilize disciplined initia-
tive to set conditions for future operations. Condition setting
allows the creation of triggers for quick reaction to incidents
as they occur. However, it does CBRN professionals no good
to be the only wealth of CBRN knowledge in the organiza-
tion. We must consistently strive to build CBRN experts
who, in turn, build CBRN experts. But until that's done,
we'll just continue "filling the void."
Endnotes:
1
Kenneth M. Coleman, "Filling the Void,"
Review, Winter 2014, pp. 38–39.
2
ADRP 6-0, , 17 May 2012.
3
Dictionary,